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Abstract 
 
Cosmopolitanism is frequently criticised for overlooking the situatedness of morality and the importance 
of solidarity in their aspiration to global justice. A number of thinkers take these criticisms seriously and 
pursue ‘a communitarian path to cosmopolitanism’. Four such approaches are considered. All four view 
morality and justice as grounded in a specific social setting and hold that justice is more likely to result if 
there is some ‘we-feeling’ among people, but are simultaneously committed to expanding the realm of 
justice and moral concern to beyond national boundaries. To enable the theorisation of an expanded realm 
of situated justice and moral concern, community is conceived as not necessarily corresponding to 
political boundaries and the moral the self is seen as able and eager to loosen some of its traditional moral 
connections and to form new ones. Unfortunately, these approaches are likely to exclude significant 
segments of the world’s population from the expanded realm of moral concern they theorise, most notably, 
a large proportion of the world’s poor. It is suggested that the thought of Emmanuel Levinas might offer a 
way of reducing the gap between solidarity and moral universalism. 
 
* I would like to thank the two anonymous referees for their extremely helpful criticism and suggestions, 
as well as Paola Raunio for her patient editorial assistance. This study was made possible by financial 
support from the Office of Research, Singapore Management University, Grant 07-C242-SMU-010. 
 
Introduction 
Two significant obstacles confront cosmopolitan aspirations to global justice. First, it is a central tenet of 
cosmopolitanism that ‘every human being has a global stature as ultimate unit of moral concern’,1 yet the 
reality is that we tend to be more concerned for some than for others. In debates about global justice, the 
most important dividing line is nationality: we assign more moral weight to fellow members of our 
political community than we do to outsiders. The fact that thousands die every day from preventable, 
poverty-related causes suggest the extent to which we have failed to treat the global poor as ultimate units 
of moral concern, while reference to universal principles of justice, basic rights, and duties not to harm 
the poor by imposing a skewed economic order upon them indicates our failure to meet some of the 
lowest standards of justice. Authors closer to the communitarian side of things inform us that the 
sacrifices required for social justice are easier to extract when there is some sense of communal belonging 
among those subject to a scheme of justice.2 It is accurate to say that the lack of solidarity with the poor 
beyond our borders continues to inhibit a more just and generous treatment of them. While a sense of 
solidarity with the global poor is implicit in cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitans are reluctant to invoke our 
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common humanity, probably because whatever solidarity exists pales against the pull of national and 
local loyalties. 
 
A second obstacle relates to the source of justice. During the so-called ‘liberal-communitarian debate’ in 
political philosophy, communitarians argued against their principal target, Rawls’s book A Theory of 
Justice,3 that the same principles of justice do not hold in all political communities, as Rawls seemed to 
imply, but derive from the choices, values and circumstances of specific bounded political communities. 
So, when Rawls emphasised in his later work that his ‘justice as fairness is intended as a political 
conception of justice for a democratic society, it [therefore] tries to draw solely upon basic intuitive ideas 
that are embedded in the political institutions of a constitutional democratic regime and the public 
traditions of their interpretation’,4 the liberal-communitarian debate fizzled out and an understanding of 
justice as tied to a particular community gained in stature. The view that justice finds its most authentic 
expression when agreed upon by members of a relatively closed political community has also been used 
against cosmopolitans who argue that justice should be global in scope.5 
 
Most cosmopolitans continue to argue that universal obligations and principles of justice can be derived 
through abstraction and that the mere recognition of our complicity in maintaining an unjust global order 
or our failure to meet certain duties will spur us into working for greater global justice. However, there 
are a few cosmopolitan theorists who accept an understanding of justice as situated and who take 
seriously the importance of solidarity in achieving social justice, that is, they accept certain central 
communitarian premises, while at the same time remaining committed to the goal of cosmopolitan justice. 
The theoretical route they map out may be described, in Richard Shapcott’s terms, as a ‘communitarian 
path to cosmopolitanism’6 and entails starting from a specific community and from there gradually 
expanding the realm of justice and moral concern to a point of universal inclusion. These authors retain 
from the communitarian critics of cosmopolitanism an understanding of morality and justice as grounded 
in a specific social setting and the view that justice and moral regard are more likely to follow where there 
is some measure of solidarity among people. However, this group of authors parts ways with narrower 
forms of communitarianism through their commitment to expand and deepen the realm of justice and 
moral concern to beyond national boundaries, as well as in their effort to loosen (but not abandon) the 
hold of local loyalties and put in its place a form of solidarity that is at least thicker than that found in 
impartialist cosmopolitanism. Furthermore, to make possible the theorisation of an expanded realm of 
justice and moral concern, community is conceived as not necessarily corresponding to political 
boundaries, the self is held to be able to loosen some of its traditional moral connections and to form new 
ones and is frequently inscribed with an element that drives it towards the other out of moral concern. The 
four approaches discussed below put the West at the centre of the expanding moral community they 
envision, an expansion that is driven largely by moral self-questioning internal to the West, rather than by 
pressure from those on the outside clamouring for moral consideration by the West. Placing the West at 
the centre of an expanding moral realm makes sense because the global institutional order that continues 
to cause unnecessary harm to the world’s poor,7 remains a Western-dominated one8 and global reforms in 
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favour of the world’s poor are unlikely to come about without buy-in and sacrifice from the rich societies 
of the West. 
 
This article identifies and describes four communitarian paths to cosmopolitanism: the first centres on the 
ideas of Richard Rorty; the second can be found in the Habermas-inspired writing of Andrew Linklater; 
the third draws its inspiration from Gadamer and can be found in the writings of Richard Shapcott and to 
a lesser extent Fred Dallmayr; while the fourth considers the most recent contribution on this matter, Toni 
Erskine’s embedded cosmopolitanism. The four approaches I am examining differ from other well-known 
accounts of situated cosmopolitanism, such as those of Bhabha and Appiah.9 Both Bhabha and Appiah 
emphasise the significance of local loyalties, but do not provide an account of how people move towards 
more universal solidarity. In Bhabha’s account of ‘vernacular cosmopolitanism’, the goal is not 
movement towards a universal moral community that unites the privileged and disadvantaged, but rather 
solidarity among the dispossessed. Appiah’s account of ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ does endorse the idea 
of a universal moral community, but he starts from the premise that this sort of cosmopolitanism is 
always already part of our moral outlook, and that the task is simply to balance the local and the global. 
Neither, therefore, specifically addresses the idea of a ‘path’ to cosmopolitanism - that is, the nature of the 
movement by which local loyalties are loosened and solidarity expanded. This is the challenge addressed 
by the four authors I am considering. 
 
The first, longer part of this article considers the four communitarian paths to cosmopolitanism. The 
significance of these four communitarian paths to cosmopolitanism lies in their aspiration to mitigate the 
opposition between those who opt for a view of justice and morality as contextual and bounded versus 
those who see justice and morality as impartial and universal, as well as in overcoming the conservative 
consequences of seeing justice and moral regard as situated in primarily national settings. If this 
aspiration is realised, it would be a major step forward in debates about global justice. The primary aim of 
this article is to show that unfortunately, however, these approaches are likely to exclude significant 
segments of the world’s population from the expanded realms of moral concern they are likely to create, 
most notably, a large proportion of the world’s poor. It is hard to see how approaches that purport to be 
cosmopolitan but are likely to exclude large numbers of people can still lay claim to the label of 
cosmopolitanism. It is therefore necessary to rely on a form of cosmopolitanism with immediate universal 
scope. In order for this article to offer more than mere criticism, in the second, shorter part I pursue a 
secondary aim, where it will be suggested that the thought of Emmanuel Levinas can be used to infuse 
and support universalist cosmopolitanism with a form of solidarity, based not on shared membership of a 
morally significant group, but on the open-ended and asymmetrical responsibility of the self for the other. 
 
Rorty’s ironic liberalism 
 
Rorty is very aware that ‘it is hard to be both enchanted with one version of the world and tolerant of all 
others’.10 As Rorty sees it, the conflict between our loyalty to fellow citizens and the consideration we 
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give outsiders, is not a conflict between loyalty and justice, but rather a conflict between different 
loyalties or solidarities.11 Rorty regards the insistence that we should be concerned for someone simply 
because he is a human being as ‘a weak, unconvincing explanation of a generous action’.12 Rather, moral 
regard for others is a matter of we-feeling, a recognition of others as ‘one of us’. For Rorty, our moral 
identity is a result of the group or groups with which we identify and a moral dilemma is being forced to 
choose between loyalty to different groups which we cannot alienate and still ‘like’ ourselves.13 For Rorty, 
there is no universal, objective standpoint from which to resolve these conflicting loyalties. Moreover, 
Rorty rejects the universalism and impartiality usually associated with cosmopolitanism, yet he 
nevertheless states that a ‘global, cosmopolitan’ society is one of his ‘social hopes’.14 So, how does one 
move towards a cosmopolitan society, especially in light of Rorty’s view that we either ‘attach a special 
privilege to our own community, or we pretend an impossible tolerance for every other group’?15 
 
The answer lies in the self’s ability to expand her moral loyalties. The self does not have an essence, but 
stands at the crossroads of different social narratives and mostly understands herself in terms of the ones 
in which she was brought up.16 It is important for Rorty’s purposes to have a conception of the self that 
does not cling to its identity too tightly and who is even willing to push away local loyalties and identities. 
The willingness to rearrange and expand one’s moral sympathies resides most strongly in a figure Rorty 
calls a ‘liberal ironist’. Ironists recognise the contingency of their identities and moral affiliations and fear 
that they have ‘been initiated into the wrong tribe, taught to play the wrong language game’ and that they 
will only come to know ‘the people in their own neighbourhood’.17 These concerns lead the ironist to 
explore new vocabularies and the lives of strange people, families and communities.18 She is helped along 
in particular by texts that illuminate the lives of people once thought of as strange, that give us the terms 
to redescribe ourselves and others, and that help us to notice cruelty and oppression where previously we 
saw nothing wrong. New descriptions alter the way we regard others and our relationships with them and 
thus clear the way for a reconfiguration of our moral relationships. But irony alone is not enough, for on 
its own it runs the risk of frivolity, hence Rorty’s tendency to attach irony to liberalism. A liberal is 
someone who thinks that ‘cruelty is the worst thing we do’ and for whom what matters is ‘making sure 
she notices suffering when it occurs’ and not worry about finding a reason to care about suffering.19 
 
Liberal irony combines a concern for the suffering of other people with the desire to pay more attention to 
people once thought of as strange. While ‘[w]e always have to start from where we are’, it becomes 
possible to redescribe ourselves in ways that bring more and different people into view and to recognise 
them as being like us, to see ‘strange people as fellow sufferers’.20 It is through stories, preferably ‘long, 
sad, sentimental’ ones, that we ‘the rich, safe, powerful people [have come] to tolerate and even to cherish 
powerless people - people whose appearance or habits or beliefs at first seemed an insult to our own 
moral identities, our sense of the limits of permissible human variation’.21 The creation of new solidarities 
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is a gradual process, they have to be created ‘out of little pieces, rather than found already waiting, in the 
form of an ur-language which all of us recognise when we hear it’.22 
 
While one can be an ironist everywhere, it is in a liberal society that she feels most comfortable, for in 
such a society a plurality of views, orientations and lifestyles are protected, even encouraged. Liberal 
society gives considerable prominence to novelists, poets, journalists, film-makers, even social scientists 
and philosophers, for these are the people who put forward new descriptions of other people and 
explanations of our impact on them. In recent times, actors, pop stars, ‘infotainment’ television channels, 
even comedians have also come to play a role in bringing to the fore injustice and overlooked lives.23 
However, in Rorty’s view, there is more to liberal society than the protection of ‘connoisseurs of 
difference’.24 It is a society that constantly tries to get rid of the ‘curse’ of ethnocentrism, of the blind 
spots that come from having to ‘start from where we are’. Liberal society fights against its ‘ethnocentrism’ 
by ‘constantly adding on more windows, constantly enlarging its sympathies’.25 Rorty claims that part of 
the liberal tradition is ‘that the human stranger from whom all dignity has been stripped is to be taken in, 
to be reclothed with dignity’.26 Once the formerly excluded and degraded have been brought in, their 
dignity restored, they ‘are treated just like all the rest of us’.27 
 
New descriptions help us to see strange people as ‘fellow sufferers’.28 However, all strangers are not at 
the same distance from our moral regard. Those on the doorstep of our moral regard, of being included as 
one of us, are persons who already have some power of expression, people speaking for them, a foothold 
in our imagination. Those who are most distant from our moral concern, who are least likely to be 
included as one of us, are the ones whose voices are not even heard, whose representatives we don’t really 
listen to (in so far as they are politically organised), persons whose lives are so different from ours that we 
have trouble identifying with them - the ‘subaltern’, if you like. It seems that the unheard and unimagined 
- who are likely to include a large chunk of the world’s poor - need justice, or ‘loyalty’, just as much, if 
not more, than persons who already stand on the doorstep of our imaginations, and they need it before we 
eventually come to regard them as one of us. 
 
In conclusion, the work of Molly Cochran should be mentioned. She is probably the most important 
commentator on Rorty’s relevance for international ethics.29 Her strongest criticism of Rorty is of his 
insistence on the public-private split, which she argues enables the Rortian moral self to be withdrawn 
and politically disinterested.30 She gets rid of the private-public distinction and marries Rorty to feminism 
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in order to give his pragmatism a greater political appetite. Cochran’s politicisation of Rorty’s position, 
whatever its coherence, might bring the plight of more people into the public sphere, but does not solve 
the deeper problem that some people have so little voice and are so far from our moral imaginations that 
they remain unlikely to be served by our greater political activity. 
 
Linklater’s Habermasian approach 
 
Andrew Linklater’s concern with reducing the tension of being ‘men’ and ‘citizens’ at the same time has 
been evident since the publication of his first book.31 Compared to the other theorists discussed in this 
article, Linklater’s approach engages most directly and explicitly with the limits imposed by the 
international state system and raison d’état. He explains that in contrast to the multiple and overlapping 
loyalties of the Middle Ages, the modern nation-state drew local loyalties to itself in order to meet the 
challenge of interstate war.32 The consequence of such a stronger association between nation and state 
was the hardening of the moral boundaries that separated insiders from outsiders.33 The loyalty 
commanded by the nation-state frequently saw citizens attach ‘more moral significance than is justified to 
the differences between fellow-nationals and aliens’.34 Linklater, like other cosmopolitans, associates 
such exaggerated loyalty to one’s fellow citizens with unfair and inconsiderate treatment of outsiders who 
are affected by our actions.35 
 
Despite the successes of the modern state and the strong centripetal pull it has exerted on communal 
loyalty, it has not succeeded in fully silencing the notion that there is ‘a community of humankind’ and 
that we ought to aspire to it.36 Linklater notes that ‘[n]ational boundaries have been highly permeable and 
social bonds have displayed limited and precarious coherence in most of the territories governed by 
modern states’,37 partly because contemporary European states have demanded a lesser loyalty than their 
antecedents.38 Linklater’s approach is to identify and develop the moral resources that lie subdued in 
modern states, such as the Kantian belief that the extension of rights and equal treatment to previously 
excluded people is inherent to modern (liberal) societies.39 
 
It is in the modern citizen that Linklater locates resistance to the homogenising pressures and 
exclusionary tendencies of nationalism. In Linklater’s words, ‘[i]f modernity has the potential to make 
significant progress towards a universal communication community, it is because of the resources 
provided by the modern conceptions of citizenship’.40 Linklater sees in modern citizenship a commitment 
to question the denial of legal and political rights to certain segments of the population, redistribute 
wealth and power, and recognise and preserve important cultural differences within the national political 
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community.41 While not unrelated, Linklater leaves the links between citizenship and aspirations to 
greater universalism, equality and sensitivity to cultural difference rather opaque. The impulse towards 
universalism, equality and respect for difference seems rather to lie in the modernity of Linklater’s 
citizens. Linklater identifies the internal questioning of the morality of bounded communities as possible 
in communities at all stages of development, but claims such questioning to be a central feature of 
modernity.42 An eagerness to systematically reflect on the scope and defensibility of one’s morality is 
typically found under conditions of modernity and reflects a ‘particular moral psychology’, specifically, 
the attainment of a post-conventional stage of moral development.43 During the pre-conventional stage of 
moral consciousness, individuals obey rules because they fear sanctions from a higher authority; during 
the conventional stage, rules are obeyed out of loyalty and to maintain the social order; while during the 
post-conventional stage individuals stand back from group loyalties and authority structures in order to 
discern principles that have only local relevance and those that have universal validity.44 Processes of 
modernity, such as urbanisation and bureaucratisation, push people into situations that require cooperation 
but in which traditional values, conceptions of the good or decision-making principles are not readily 
applicable or acceptable to others from different backgrounds. In short, modernity generates the need for 
normative agreement with transcultural validity. 
 
But how does one establish the wider validity of moral propositions under conditions of modernity? 
Linklater sides with intellectual currents that emphasise the social construction of knowledge and the 
drifting character of moral truth, which rules out universalist approaches that claim ‘an Archimedean 
perspective’.45 Drawing on Habermas, Linklater argues that the path to universalism is through dialogue 
among all who stand to be affected by a norm.46 A universal norm is one which is acceptable to all who 
stand to be affected by the consequences of its observance.47 Although such norms are based on an 
underlying consensus that might shift, Habermas predicts that once recognised, norms will not fluctuate 
wildly but will remain stable.48 Participants enter conversations with the knowledge that they do not have 
a monopoly on moral truth and without knowing what will be agreed upon. In fact, participants have to 
accept that their argument might fail to convince others.49 The use of dialogue to establish moral 
universals allows Linklater to pursue and reduce the tension between two opposite goals, universality and 
respect for cultural difference, for dialogic agreement is not tied to or imposed by a specific culture.50 
 
More recently, Linklater has augmented his preferred view of the moral self as someone concerned with 
the universal defensibility of her actions by inscribing the moral self with anxiety about harming others, a 
concern for alleviating suffering and for expanding empathy.51 These additions further enmesh the moral 
self with the other and provide the self with a stronger impetus to be concerned with the plight of others. 
However, it is not clear how they fit in with the communicative aspects of Linklater’s approach. Further 
difficulty lies therein that although Linklater’s texts are shot through with erudite presentations of a wide 
range of thinkers, it is often hard to tell what Linklater thinks of their ideas or to discern their exact role in 
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his argument. What is clearer is the continuity between Linklater’s identification of tendencies, both real 
and potential, towards a universal communication community inherent in modern citizenship52 and his 
highlighting of the expanded sensitivity for the wellbeing of those beyond our national borders that has 
developed in international society. The trajectory Linklater sees in modern citizenship and the 
aforementioned expanded sensitivity towards others in international society provide the basis for some 
measure of solidarity with outsiders. It is also possible to locate a source of solidarity in arguments that 
Linklater does not make, but that would nevertheless be consistent with his project, given its Habermasian 
underpinnings. One could argue that the creation of dialogic, supra-national political institutions, as 
propagated by Linklater, would allow people with diverse cultural identities as well as those who have 
been uprooted from their local and national loyalties by processes of modernisation and globalisation to 
find solidarity in the more abstract foundation of a shared political culture, more specifically, in loyalty to 
a (democratic) constitution, which Habermas refers to as ‘constitutional patriotism’.53 
 
Linklater’s aim of ‘universalism’, the creation of ‘a community that is coexistensive with the whole 
human race’,54 is premised on his claims about the post-conventional self, the moral permeability of the 
nation-state and growing concern for harm and suffering across borders. However, he is aware that 
political boundaries still obstruct the universalism he seeks. Linklater therefore sees as necessary a 
‘divorce of citizenship from the state’ and for it to be ‘reworked in light of multiple allegiances’ and 
placed with different levels of authority, such as the town, the province, the state, the region and the 
world.55 This possibility is most present in the ‘pacified core’ and in Europe in particular.56 However, 
Linklater does not explain how such a transformation of political community is to be extended beyond the 
pacified core. Habermas’s own forays into International Political Theory are similarly confined to 
Europe.57 
 
Apart from the practical difficulty of extending a moral community beyond the West, Linklater’s 
aspiration to universality contains a further problem. Linklater’s use of Habermas’s requirement that 
participants in true dialogue be post-conventional agents exposes him to the charge that this requirement 
excludes pre-conventional and conventional agents from moral discussion and therefore fails to be 
universally inclusive.58 Linklater states explicitly that a post-conventional morality ‘reflects a particular 
stage in moral development’ and that the willingness to subject oneself to universalisable norms and to 
expand the scope of moral regard are two features of ‘the more advanced moral codes’.59 According to 
Shapcott, this means that a ‘truly moral relationship between modern and pre-modern agents appears 
impossible because those outside of the discourse of modernity are seen, like children, as not mature 
enough for reasoned discussion’.60 Thus, despite its aspiration to universal inclusion, Linklater’s discourse 
ethics in effect restricts the types of agents who can practically participate in the conversation. Moreover, 
as the world’s more traditional societies also tend to be the world’s poorest, Linklater is likely to include 
large numbers of poor people from a universal communication community. 
 
                                                     
52
 Ibid., p. 144. 
53
 Habermas Jürgen, The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), p. 74; The 
Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), p. 118. 
54
 Linklater, Critical Theory, p. 36. 
55
 Linklater, Transformation, p. 197. 
56
 Ibid., p. 8. 
57
 Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other and The Postnational Constellation. 
58
 Shapcott, Justice, Community and Dialogue, p. 123. 
59
 Linklater, Critical Theory, pp. 51, 36. 
60
 Shapcott, Justice, Community and Dialogue, p. 98. 
9 
 
A Gadamerian approach 
 
Richard Shapcott and Fred Dallmayr aspire to a cosmopolitan community that does justice to difference 
and therefore reject impartialist versions of cosmopolitanism. Writing under the influence of the 
philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer, they regard the oppositional character of the so-
called ‘cosmopolitan-communitarian debate’ as overdrawn because it does not take adequate account of 
the role of communication with those outside one’s community.61 For Gadamerian cosmopolitans, 
communication across borders indicates that moral boundaries are not closed.62 This is an important step 
in Gadamerian cosmopolitanism’s argument that a cosmopolitan community is possible. A second 
important step is the defining of community as an ‘act of inclusion in the moral world’.63 This ‘loose’ 
definition of community, as Shapcott himself calls it, abandons a shared identity as one of the defining 
elements of community, which makes entry into such a community easier and allows more space for 
difference.64 
 
Both Gadamerian and Habermasian approaches emphasise dialogic solutions to moral quandaries, yet 
they differ about the overriding purpose of dialogue. Unlike Linklater’s Habermasian approach, a 
Gadamerian approach does not require that consensus or agreement should be the goal of conversation. 
Rather, the purpose of conversation is held to be ‘understanding’, the coming to see things in a new and 
shared light as a result of dialogue with others. Gadamerians do not deny that consensus has its place,65 
but argue that by placing such emphasis on it, Habermasians fail to take into account that many of the 
moral problems we grapple with do not have or aspire to universally justifiable solutions, but are 
experienced as moral problems nonetheless. 
 
Gadamerian cosmopolitans have a rosier view of the self’s acculturation and situatedness than do the 
other theorists discussed in this article, who strongly associate acculturation with myopia and indifference 
to outsiders. As one would expect, Dallmayr and Shapcott reject cosmopolitan approaches that seek to 
monologically derive impartial and universal principles of justice, because ‘[c]ut loose from vernacular 
moorings and beliefs, [such] cosmopolitanism remains a mere flight of fancy, unable to engage the hearts 
and minds as well as the existential agonies of human beings’.66 What is perhaps more surprising, is that 
Gadamerians identify similar problems in a Habermasian dialogic approach, arguing that despite efforts to 
ground morality, Habermasian discourse becomes ‘a quasi-transcendental platform predicated on 
idealised conditions of speech’ in which participants need to have momentarily suspended their ‘ordinary 
actions’ in order to participate.67 The Gadamerian approach does not deny that acculturation is a brake on 
the self’s ability to morally relate to strangers. However, in this approach, the weight of acculturation and 
situatedness is seen in a more positive light; less as a constraint to be overcome and more as what enables 
and steers the self into conversation and thus into a moral relationship with others. 
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Our perspective on the world is dominated by ‘what is nearest to us’.68 Even when we attempt to look 
beyond what is near and familiar, ‘not in order to look away from it, but to see it better, within a larger 
whole and in a truer proportion’, our view remains limited to a ‘horizon’, albeit an expanded one.69 It is 
an acknowledgement of our finitude, our not-knowing, that directs us towards dialogue with the other so 
as to expand our horizon. Conversation also makes the ideas and perspectives of other people more 
intelligible, without us necessarily agreeing with their points of view.70 Understanding, ‘a fusion of 
horizons’, involves the sharing of a new and broader perspective that neither conversational partner could 
have achieved alone.71 For Gadamer, understanding, and even consensus, is always partial and temporary 
as it stands in, not outside, an evolving tradition. ‘We always find ourselves within a situation, and 
throwing light on it is a task that is never entirely finished’.72 Unfortunately, Gadamer, unlike Habermas, 
gives little indication of the social factors that make the questioning of our own truth claims and entry into 
dialogue with others more likely.73 At most, Gadamer thinks such self-questioning to be most likely in 
gebildete (cultured) societies, societies in which people have acquired norms that are more widely 
defensible as well as the capacity to acquire such norms.74 
 
Our shared capacity for language, in which our capacity to reason and understand resides, means that the 
reach of philosophical hermeneutics is potentially universal.75 However, our shared capacity for language 
is on its own not enough to arrive at and support the search for just solutions to problems of coexistence. 
Deliberation about justice, a task of practical reason, requires some degree of solidarity among people and 
for Shapcott, this solidarity ought to be universal so as to mirror the universalistic drive in philosophical 
hermeneutics.76 Solidarity refers to a sphere of identification or of ‘we’ feeling and can be built on as little 
as ‘an acknowledgement of a shared historical predicament, situation or of a common future’.77 
Importantly, solidarity is built and expanded through conversation; dialogue is both the goal of a thin 
cosmopolitan community and the means to get there.78 
 
Shapcott frequently points to the ‘radical inclusivity’ of the philosophical hermeneutical approach,79 
which is contrasted with Habermasian discourse ethics that stands accused of excluding ‘pre-modern’ 
agents from genuine dialogue. Dialogue, in philosophical hermeneutics, is understood as a ‘universal 
capacity’ and ‘radically inclusive of all linguistically constituted beings capable of understanding’.80 
Moreover, ‘[t]he creation of new solidarities requires an effort to understand and above all, engage in 
conversation’.81 However, in the Gadamerian approach, openness to genuine dialogue and understanding 
stem from an awareness of one’s finitude and a questioning of one’s truth claims.82 Although all people 
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might presumably recognise their finitude, and even though no one is excluded in advance from genuine 
dialogue, individual recognition of finitude is least likely in the world’s least modern societies,83 which 
also tend to be the world poorest.84 The Gadamerian approach thus succumbs to a flaw similar to the one 
Shapcott identified in the Habermasian approach.85 
 
Erkine’s embedded cosmopolitanism 
 
Toni Erskine rejects forms of cosmopolitanism that claim impartiality or rely on ‘abstract appeals to our 
common humanity’.86 For her, the only realistic starting point for thinking about the moral treatment of 
others is against a background that gives sufficient weight to local context and particular ties. Erskine is 
awake to the dangers of situated moralities. These are sometimes internally oppressive and frequently 
insensitive to the claims of outsiders. Her focus is on moral concern for outsiders, specifically, the 
potential for expanding the sphere of equal moral standing, that is, ‘the realm of those whose moral worth 
is considered to be on par with our own when we attempt to negotiate questions of obligations in 
international relations’. 87 In light of her commitment to particular ties and local context, she therefore 
needs ‘a situated morality that can at the same time be outward-looking and inclusive’.88 After 
considering the contributions of John Rawls, Alisdair MacIntyre, Mervyn Frost and, most seriously, 
Michael Walzer, she identifies the ideas of Marilyn Friedman as most able to help her navigate the 
demands of the local and the global.89 
 
Erskine places Friedman and herself in the tradition of ‘different voice’ feminism. This approach traces its 
roots to Carol Gilligan’s critique of moral perspectives that emphasise rules, rights and non-interference, 
as opposed to the approach she favours in which there is an emphasis on care, specific relationships and 
unique situations. 90 In Erskine’s text, the prominence given to care in Gilligan’s work has fallen by the 
wayside. The word is mentioned occasionally, but receives little discussion. Erskine’s concern seems to 
be that an ‘ethics of care’ would focus too strongly on existing relationships at the expense of those 
beyond a necessarily small circle.91 Nevertheless, Erskine has retained different voice feminism’s 
emphasis on the centrality of particular relationships for the moral subject. 
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Erskine’s preference for situated morality and the moral importance she attributes to particular 
relationships make communitarian writings naturally attractive to her. However, she is uncomfortable 
with various aspects of communitarian thinking about the relation between morality and community: an 
intolerance of difference and an enslavement to tradition; the difficulty of internal criticism in the absence 
of external or impartial reference points; and a tendency to confine the moral community to national 
boundaries, which inadequately portrays our moral experience and diminishes the claims of outsiders. 
Friedman’s notion of a ‘dislocated community’ seems to provide Erskine with a way out. 
 
For Erskine, solidarity ‘arises from respect for the ethical standing of fellow moral agents with whom one 
‘shares membership’ in a morally constitutive community.92 Drawing on Friedman, it is argued that 
individuals are at the same time a member of a variety of identity-constituting communities. These 
communities are not necessarily territorially defined or communities in which we grew up, but might also 
include communities that are geographically dispersed and communities of choice. The self’s various 
communal affiliations overlap and are not necessarily exclusive. By drawing on Friedman’s redescription 
of the pattern of the self’s moral affiliations, while steering clear of claims to impartiality, Erskine’s 
embedded cosmopolitanism is able to avoid the problems she sees in communitarian views of morality, 
mentioned in the previous paragraph. 
 
To accompany her use of the notion of a dislocated community, Erskine needs a conception of the moral 
self that is situated yet able and indeed eager to form moral relations with those beyond the borders of her 
political community. She finds what she is looking for in Friedman’s notion of the ‘complex situated self’. 
While the complex situated self is shaped by the territorial, national community in which she grew up, 
Erskine’s reference to dislocated communities allows her to reject the assumption that bounded 
communities have the ‘exclusive capacity to define the individual moral agent’.93 Imagine an Iranian-born, 
naturalised American, who works as a biology professor in Japan, is a committed member of Greenpeace 
and a passionate supporter of Liverpool Football Club. According to Erskine and Friedman, such a person 
is a member of various ‘particular, often transnational, overlapping, territorial, and non-territorial morally 
constitutive communities’.94 Viewing the moral self in this way makes it easy to see that the self is 
morally connected to persons beyond the borders of her political community. 
 
Clearly, the challenge becomes ‘how to reconcile the conflicting claims, demands, and identity-defining 
influences of the variety of communities of which one is part’.95 Things are thus considerably more 
complex than when styled in terms of a cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, which presents the options 
as being between loyalty to the national and the global. Instead of trying to solve the divergent demands 
placed on the moral self, Erskine leaves it as a matter of individual choice. 
 
Embedded cosmopolitanism should be commended for many things, particularly for its more accurate 
mapping of moral relations. However, as Erskine admits, embedded cosmopolitanism is not ‘problem-
free’, for, ‘[u]nlike its impartialist counterpart, it cannot claim a necessarily inclusive moral purview’.96 
One aspect of this problem is the failure of communities to overlap, since, for her, our moral regard for 
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others is ‘inspired by shared membership within a particular community’.97 Erskine shows how even 
enemies can come to recognise the moral worth of their opponents through the example of soldiers on 
opposing sides finding common ground in their shared Christianity during World War I. However, she 
also shows how no such common ground was found, and no heightening of moral regard took place, 
when opposing soldiers did not share a Christian background, as when Christians and Muslim Algerians 
fighting for France faced each other. Another area in which there is unlikely to be significant overlap is 
between citizens of the world’s well-off countries and poor people living in the least-developed countries, 
a shortcoming that embedded cosmopolitanism shares with the other approaches discussed above. 
 
Whereas impartialist cosmopolitanism centrally posits an allegiance to all human beings, embedded 
cosmopolitanism defines itself in negative terms ‘as preventing the sphere of equal moral standing from 
being coterminous with any particular community or group of communities’.98 However, this still does 
not solve the problem of exclusion. In Erskine’s frank diagnosis, which also applies to the other 
approaches discussed above, this failure to include everyone in the moral purview ‘points to the limits of 
an attempt to accommodate the situated self and a global sphere of equal moral standing within a single 
normative approach’. 
 
Universal inclusion and asymmetric responsibility 
 
Thus far, we have discussed four attempts to combine a universal level of moral inclusivity with both a 
view of justice and morality as situated and a thicker measure of solidarity than that found in impartialist 
forms of cosmopolitanism which posit the scope of moral concern as immediately universal. 
Unfortunately, all four attempts to reach a cosmopolitan destination from communitarian origins were 
argued to have come up short, getting stuck at what might be described as variously shaped transnational 
moral communities, rather than a cosmopolitan one.99 The exclusion of some groups from our moral 
purview, merely because we do not or are not likely to share the requisite amount of we-feeling with them, 
does not diminish the injustice or harsh existence they might endure. It was argued that a significant 
proportion of the global poor stood to be excluded from the expanded moral communities theorised by the 
authors discussed above. This is a particularly glaring omission if one considers that cosmopolitan writing 
of the past few decades has been overwhelmingly concerned with and motivated by the extent of global 
poverty and the lack of global distributive justice.100 It is worrying that in all four approaches one finds 
hardly any discussion of distributive justice.101 
 
Cosmopolitans seem to be confronted with a dilemma. They either have to adopt a sub-global reach of 
moral concern but with a good measure of solidarity, or insist that moral concern is global in reach but 
accept a diminished claim to solidarity. The theorists discussed in this article represent the former option, 
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while impartialist cosmopolitans like Thomas Pogge and Peter Singer represent the second option.102 
What is therefore needed is a form of justice and morality that includes everyone within its scope, while 
offering a stronger sense of solidarity than one finds in cosmopolitan approaches that lay claim to such 
immediate, universal inclusivity. I want to suggest that it might be possible to reduce the tension between 
the twin goals of solidarity and a universally inclusive moral realm by turning to the work of Emmanuel 
Levinas.103 Levinas rejects claims that underneath it all our concern for the other stems from our common 
humanity, whether the other person is one of us, or whether he is someone with whom we have something 
in common. Rather, solidarity is based upon the self’s asymmetrical and open-ended responsibility for the 
other person. The self’s unequal responsibility for the other is intended to support a realm of moral 
concern of global scope and thus addresses the motivational deficit that has hampered impartialist forms 
of cosmopolitanism. Those authors who pursue a communitarian path to cosmopolitanism have also 
sought to address this deficit, but, as has been argued, got stuck at a moral community with transnational, 
rather than global, scope. In the rest of this section, I describe a Levinasian solidarity with the other and 
indicate how a Levinasian ethic might attach itself to a cosmopolitan morality with a genuinely universal 
scope. 
 
Levinas’s project is to lay bare an aspect of inter-subjectivity that Western philosophy has overlooked and 
suppressed: the ethical relation between the self and the other. Levinas interprets the history of Western 
philosophy as a persistent attempt to arrive at a universal synthesis, an effort to find a place for everything 
in a larger order.104 Behind this totalising march lies the free, but vulnerable, subject - a being ‘exposed to 
exterior realities that shelter, but also threaten, its freedom’.105 As the self is vulnerable to the world that 
surrounds it, it seeks to establish a world of order and predictability. The self is vulnerable not only to 
threats from the natural world, such as floods and disease, but also to the other person. What is strange 
and other must therefore be reduced to intelligible terms, categorised, and arranged and contained in a 
larger totality. In its efforts at understanding and knowledge, categorisation and conceptualisation, the 
free self strips the other of its otherness, chains it to a concept and puts it in its designated place in the 
social order.106 For Levinas, such regard of the other as a mere cog in a wheel constitutes ‘violence’, 
defined as any treatment that fails to regard the other in its individuality.107 
 
Ironically, however, these efforts at grasping the other, at suppressing his otherness, confining him to a 
certain place in the social order, already suggest his otherness. Moreover, although it is possible to 
understand the other ‘in terms of his history, his environment, his habits’,108 at the very moment such 
understanding is achieved, the other in his singularity has slipped away. As Levinas puts it, the other is 
                                                     
102
 Pogge, World Poverty; Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’. 
103
 Levinas’s ideas have found some application in the field of International Ethics, most significantly in Campbell 
David, ‘The Deterritorialization of Responsibility: Levinas, Derrida, and Ethics after the End of Philosophy’, 
Alternatives, 19 (1996), pp. 455-484. Recent pieces that relate Levinas to matters global justice, include Avsar 
Servan Adar, ‘Responsive Ethics and the War against Terrorism: A Levinasian Perspective, Journal of Global Ethics, 
3 (2007), pp. 317-334; Dauphinee Elizabeth, ‘Emmanuel Levinas’, in Edkins and Vaughan-Williams, Critical 
Theorists, pp. 235-245; Jordaan Eduard, ‘Cosmopolitanism, Freedom and Indifference: A Levinasian View’, 
Alternatives, 34 (2009), pp. 83-106; and Schiff Jacob, ‘The Trouble with "Never Again!": Rereading Levinas for 
Genocide Prevention and Critical International Theory’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 36 (2007), pp. 
22-47. 
104
 Levinas Emmanuel, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University 
Press, 1985), p. 75. 
105
 Levinas Emmanuel, Collected Philosophical Papers (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), p. 49. 
106
 Levinas Emmanuel, Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other (London: Athlone Press, 1998), p. 9. 
107
 Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers, p. 20. 
108
 Levinas, Entre Nous, p. 9. 
15 
 
‘both graspable and escaping every hold’.109 The other ultimately evades my grasp, not because he is too 
obscure to be understood and rendered intelligible, but because the other is by definition a being who 
refuses to be contained in a category.110 
 
The ethical aspects of Levinas’s writing come to the fore most strongly in his phenomenological 
description of catching sight of the ‘face’ of the other. The face is a dense concept that connotes a number 
of things: First, the face of other suggests the irreducible uniqueness of the other person; a being who 
ultimately evades efforts at comprehension, representation, categorisation, conceptualisation and 
containment within a system of thought. Secondly, the face calls to mind a relationship ‘without the 
mediation of any principle or ideality’.111 Normally, we relate to others as custom dictates or in terms of 
the social roles or categories they occupy.112 However, in the immediacy of the face-to-face, the other 
‘manifests itself in terms of itself, without a concept’ and thus pierces all conventions and conceptions 
that stand between us.113 Thirdly, the face of the other evokes defencelessness and a vulnerability to my 
freedom - ‘the resistance of what has no resistance’ - and as a result arrests my freedom and shows it to be 
unjust and injurious.114 Fourth, the face of the other issues a command against indifference to her plight. 
The face commands me to be responsible.115 
 
The face, in all its facets mentioned above, awakens me to my domination of the other and disturbs my 
egoism.116 Although the exercise of my freedom may have been naïve and not intended the other any 
harm, ‘[t]o approach the other is to put into question my freedom, my spontaneity as a living being, my 
emprise over the things’.117 It is a ‘crisis of being’ because the self sees its role in the suppression of the 
other as other so as to allow the self to maintain and enjoy its freedom. It is a crisis of being because the 
self becomes aware that its life has been a usurpation of the place of someone else. The self must confront 
the question of whether its being is justified,118 for, through its mere existence, the self is implicated in the 
death of the other.119 If this is so, how can the self ever hope to justify its right to be?120 
 
For Levinas, the rehabilitation and affirmation of the subject takes place through the other and requires 
that the subject negate itself and give to the other, to empty its being in an asymmetrical and infinite 
responsibility and concern for the other.121 In this ethical relation with the other (to be distinguished from 
the political relation with the other, see below), it does not matter who the other is or what group he 
belongs to because the face breaks and commands through all these categories. Levinas’s conception of 
responsibility for the other person represents a clear departure from approaches that link moral regard 
with a shared identity, some measure of we-feeling, or our shared humanity. Responsibility for the other 
derives from his irreducible difference. Furthermore, it also does not matter how the other behaves 
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towards me; ‘he is above all the one I am responsible for’.122 By taking up my responsibility for the other 
I am drawn into a deeper responsibility for him as I become involved in situations and problems that do 
not stem from something I have done but that are nonetheless my concern because they affect the other - I 
care about a better justice because that is what I want for the other. At the same time, responsibility for 
the other requires a constant struggle against the centripetal concern with one’s own existence.123 Levinas 
writes that as I increasingly ‘divest myself, under the traumatic effect of persecution, of my freedom as a 
constituted, wilful, imperialist subject, the more I discover myself to be responsible; the more just I am, 
the more guilty I am’.124 This ‘persecution’ by the other is the foundation of solidarity with him and it 
starts with the putting in question of my freedom by the presence of the other.125 
 
As long as it is only the self and the other, matters are straightforward because the other always takes 
precedence over me. But there are always many others who also command my infinite responsibility, 
represented in the figure of ‘the third’.126 In order to be just and to be able to respond to more than one 
other, I therefore have to limit my responsibility to the specific other and divide it among numerous others. 
The need to divide one’s responsibility marks the beginning of equality, morality, justice and politics.127 
In the dispersal of the self’s responsibility among a plurality of persons it is necessary to seek an 
arrangement of justice that will best achieve our responsibility for numerous others. More specifically, it 
becomes necessary, first, to categorise, describe, compare and judge people and their needs - to ‘compare 
the incomparable’;128 second, to seek the appropriate principles of justice and standards of judgement; and 
third, to think about and establish the institutions through which to best achieve our responsibility for 
others.129 
 
In order to respond to numerous others it therefore becomes necessary to treat the other person as a 
member of a genus. Moreover, by subjecting the other to a generalised response, rather than focusing only 
on his needs, and by directing one’s response through institutions one always comes up short in meeting 
one’s responsibility for the other. Such suppression and neglect is tolerable as long as one stays mindful 
of the singularity of the other, one’s unfinished responsibility towards him and one works towards a more 
just and sensitive order. Levinas further points out that even in the most well-intentioned institutions there 
lurks the constant danger that the uniqueness of the other and his situation will be overlooked as these 
institutions try to treat people in a more rational and objective fashion. For Levinas, ‘the negative element, 
the element of violence in the state, in the hierarchy, appears when the hierarchy functions perfectly, 
when everyone submits to universal ideas. There are cruelties because they proceed from the necessity of 
the reasonable Order. There are, if you like, the tears that a civil servant cannot see: the tears of the 
other.’130 It is therefore imperative that institutions, even seemingly just ones, always have to be 
‘perfected against their own harshness’ by being ‘made more knowing in the name, the memory, of the 
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original kindness of man toward his other’.131 This is a constant vigilance and effort that Levinas 
describes as a ‘permanent revolution’.132 
 
At this point, it might be useful to provide a summary and at the same time to cast the above presentation 
of Levinas in a slightly different light. Levinas’s aim is to expose the ethical relation with the other, to be 
distinguished from a political relation with the other.133 In the political relation with the other, I see him as 
a member of a group, as someone who fits into a category and occupies a certain place in society. 
Moreover, in the political relation, the other and I are equals; our interaction is impersonal and based on 
reciprocity, mutual respect and limited responsibility. We are allowed as much freedom as is compatible 
with the freedom of everyone else and entitled to enjoy this freedom with a clear conscience. In mass 
society, the dominant mode of our interaction is political, as Levinas acknowledges.134 By contrast, in the 
ethical relation, the other is regarded as singular, as someone who ultimately cannot be contained within a 
category. 
 
The ethical relation is one of intimacy and immediacy between self and other, a relation in which the self 
is asymmetrically and infinitely responsible to the other, irrespective of the other’s response. My freedom 
is haunted by the sense that I have in some way harmed or neglected the other. Although the prevailing 
mode of interaction in society is ‘political’, the ethical relation with the other is a permanent, though often 
overlooked, dimension of inter-subjectivity. Levinas wants to show that every person I come across is 
simultaneously a specific and a general other and that the self therefore faces a choice between whether to 
respond ethically or politically.135 While a political response to the other might be tolerable, my 
unfinished responsibility means that such a turn away from the other is tenuous, temporary and never 
fully legitimate or possible with a clear conscience. 
 
From a Levinasian perspective, the debates among cosmopolitans, communitarians and all the shades in 
between can be understood as an attempt to figure out how to arrange and implement our responsibility in 
the presence of the third at a global level. Although Levinas notes in passing the problem of the ‘splitting 
of humanity into natives and strangers’,136 his aim is not to make concrete suggestions about how to best 
balance our responsibility between people within and beyond the borders of our community, but rather to 
uncover what precedes and motivates our efforts at being responsible. Given the life-threatening urgency 
of addressing the plight of the global poor it is important to adopt a form of cosmopolitanism that allows 
us to immediately include them in the realm of moral concern and to make claims about the injustice they 
endure, rather than wait for the completion of a communitarian path to cosmopolitanism. However, one of 
the usual problems with a cosmopolitan morality and justice with universal scope is that people who are 
in a position to improve the situation of distant others who suffer injustice or moral disregard typically do 
not feel enough solidarity with them to do something about their plight. Those who have followed a 
communitarian path to cosmopolitanism have understood solidarity as based on inclusion in a morally 
significant community. A Levinasian perspective, by contrast, allows us to identify a self who feels 
solidarity with the other, not because the self shares with the other person membership of a morally 
significant group, but because the self recognises the injustice of its being, an awakening that opens up 
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into an asymmetrical and open-ended responsibility for the other person, regardless of who the other 
person might be. It is the taking up of an open-ended and non-reciprocal responsibility for the other, 
rather than we-feeling, that would carry and absorb the burden of applying a universalist moral 
perspective. 
 
Talk of infinite and asymmetrical responsibility certainly seems radical, but there are many elements in 
cosmopolitanism that reminds one of a Levinasian sensibility. It is possible to identify flashes of 
unreciprocated generosity in cosmopolitanism, as well as moments in which the self recognises its 
damaging freedom and usurpation of the place of the other, for example, in Linklater’s recognition that 
we cause ‘abstract harm’ to distant others, or Pogge’s repeated demonstrations of our involvement in 
maintaining a global economic order that predictably results in the deaths of millions of poor people every 
year,137 or cosmopolitanism’s constant questioning of the moral legitimacy of national boundaries. To be 
sure, at bottom, cosmopolitan and Levinasian positions are very different. Cosmopolitanism always 
makes it possible for the self to limit its responsibility for the other,138 whereas Levinas sees our 
responsibility as infinite. While Levinasian responsibility travels to more demanding depths, Levinasian 
ethics and cosmopolitanism both move in the same direction, that is, towards an order that is more 
generous and responsive to the other. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Cosmopolitanism’s frequent assertion of a universal realm of justice and moral concern has often been 
shot down by communitarian critics who argue that justice and morality find their truest expression in a 
situated community, that cosmopolitans underestimate the hold of local values and loyalties, and that 
whatever global solidarity exists is too thin to sustain the sacrifice, effort and cooperation one would need 
for justice and moral regard to be universal in practice. This article considered four attempts to bridge this 
cosmopolitan-communitarian divide by a group of authors who accept an understanding of justice as 
situated and agree that solidarity is necessary to realise social justice, while at the same time consider the 
goal of cosmopolitan justice to be desirable and possible. Following ‘a communitarian path to 
cosmopolitanism’ was described as the gradual expansion of a situated community’s realm of moral 
concern to the point of universal inclusion. However, it was argued that the four attempts to reach a 
cosmopolitan destination from communitarian starting points were likely to fall short, establishing 
transnational moral communities of various shapes, rather than a cosmopolitan one. The world’s poor 
were particularly likely to be excluded. Given the inability of a the four communitarian paths to 
cosmopolitanism to reach a universal level of moral inclusion, coupled with the imperative of including 
the world’s poor in any type of cosmopolitan justice, cosmopolitans seem to be left with little option but 
to adopt a form of cosmopolitanism that is immediately universally inclusive. As such forms of 
cosmopolitanism face the problem of a motivational deficit, it was suggested in the latter part of this 
article that such a deficit might be bridged by an infinitely and asymmetrically responsible moral subject, 
as found in the writings of Emmanuel Levinas. A Levinasian sensibility is not as farfetched as it may 
seem, for it makes contact with elements that can frequently be spotted in cosmopolitanism, such as 
unreciprocated generosity, considerable moral self-questioning, expiation, deep concern for the wellbeing 
of others and a worry that we are usurping that to which others also have a claim. 
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